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Best Interest of the Child Should Not Be an  
Ambiguous Term 
 
Judge Carl Funderburk∗ 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 There is no possible way to determine on any given day of the 
week the number of court rulings that affect children. In every state’s 
juvenile and family court systems, the “best interest of the child” 
standard is used to protect children, but there is no concrete definition 
of this elusive standard.1 The “best interest of the child” is a noble 
concept, yet it is unbelievably complicated to define, and even more 
difficult to put into practice.2 The notion of “best interest” does not 
lead to a neutral investigation that points to an obvious result. The 
“best interest” standard involves decision makers who are interested 
in the best outcome for children. Each decision maker, however, 
comes with his or her own set of values, thoughts, and practices 
regarding child-rearing, and may never see the child whom their 
decisions affect. Ask anyone who deals with children within the legal 
system what “best interest” is, and often they will respond, “whatever 
                                                          
* Special Judge Carl Funderburk currently serves on the domestic bench in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. He has served as Special Judge on the domestic bench for five years 
and previously as Special Judge and Referee on the juvenile bench for six years. He 
has been a guest lecturer for undergraduate law classes as well as continuing legal 
education courses for lawyers. Judge Carl Funderburk was honored as the 
“Outstanding Family Law Judge” for Oklahoma in 2011. He graduated from the 
University of Tulsa Law School in 1993 with a Juris Doctorate and from Oklahoma 
State University in 1980 with a B.A. in Humanities. In this Article, Judge 
Funderburk provides analytical exposition based, in part, on his experience on the 
bench and observations on how the “best interest” standard has been applied in 
practice.  
1 Raymie H. Wayne, The Best Interests of the Child: A Silent Standard – Will You 
Know It When You Hear It?, 2 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 33, 34 (2008).  
2 Dana E. Prescott, The AAML and a New Paradigm for “Thinking About” Child 
Custody Litigation: The Next Half Century, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 107, 110 
(2011). 
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the judge says it is.” The intent of this Article is to propose a 
structure in determining the definition of “best interest” within the 
legal system and how the standard should be applied.   
 The discussion must first begin by explaining the authority of 
the court, which must be determined in order to understand the 
court’s boundaries. If the court only deals with rights, it stands to 
reason that the best interest of the child equates to the rights of the 
child. In applying and balancing the rights of the child, the court 
should approach this in a common sense manner as set forth by 
scholars Samantha Brennan and Robert Noggle.3 This method 
requires recognizing that children have rights4 and those rights are 
equal to the rights of adults.5 However, the child’s rights are applied 
in a more limited manner because of a child’s immaturity and 
inability to knowingly exercise his or her rights. But once a child 
matures, either demonstrated prior to reaching adulthood, or upon 
reaching adulthood, the child is able to exercise their rights for 
themselves. Until such time, the parents have oversight in protecting 
their child’s rights. When the rights of the child begin to conflict with 
the rights of the parents, the government may then step in and protect 
the rights of the child as in the juvenile court system when a child is 
removed from his or her parents after allegations of abuse or neglect. 
This Article will argue that “best interest of the child” is the 
constitutional right of the child. The court’s authority is found in 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
                                                          
3 See generally Samantha Brennan & Robert Noggle, The Moral Status of 
Children: Children’s Rights, Parents’ Rights, and Family Justice, 23 SOC. THEORY 
& PRAC. 1 (1997) (observing that children are afforded the same rights that adults 
have simply by virtue of being a person; therefore, children have the same moral 
consideration as adults, although they can be treated differently from adults). 
4 See, e.g., Matter of T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468 (Okla. 1980) (reasoning that where a 
child is to be questioned, there is a requirement for a parent, guardian, attorney, or 
legal custodian to be present, and the child shall be fully advised of his or her 
constitutional and legal rights, including the right to be represented by an attorney); 
see also N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
protects children from unreasonable search and seizures conducted by public 
school officials); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (stating that juveniles have due 
process rights against compulsory self-incrimination). 
5 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 22. 
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Based upon this authority, all courts deal in the rights of the 
individual. These rights are afforded to all individuals, demanding 
the inclusion of the constitutional rights of the child when 
interpreting the best interest of a child. The court, in applying the best 
interest of the child, must therefore balance the constitutional rights 
of the child against the constitutional rights of the parents. Where the 
rights of the child are in conflict with the rights of the parent, the 
court can limit the parental authority over how the parent raises the 
child.6  
Part II of this Article posits that the term “best interest” 
should not be ambiguous—as it is frequently described—and outlines 
the steps to assist in defining the concept. Part III of this Article 
argues that the authority of the court only deals with rights, excluding 
the personal values, morals, and social bias of the judge. Part IV 
argues that if the authority of the court is to deal in “rights,” then the 
“best interest” of the child must be the rights of the child as opposed 
to simply what is good for the child. Part V describes that the court 
reconciles children having rights by recognizing that they are equal 
rights as to all individuals. Part VI goes on to explain that while those 
rights may be equal as to all individuals, they are limited during the 
age of minority of the child. Finally, Part VII emphasizes that during 
the age of minority, the government, in balancing the rights of the 
child with those of the parent, may step in when the child’s rights 
conflict with those of the parent.    
 
II. Best Interest of The Child Should Not be an Ambiguous Term 
 
  “Best Interest of the child” is often quoted within the 
hallowed halls of juvenile and domestic courtrooms. The term is 
almost exclusively used when dealing with the care of children.7 But 
                                                          
6 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631-32 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
7 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that parents have the 
liberty right and obligation to raise and care for their children, which in turn serves 
the interest of the children). It is not the role of the court system to interfere with 
this right unless the actions of the parents rise to the level of abuse or neglect. 
Skrapka v. Bonner, 187 P.3d 202, 214 (Okla. 2008). When the court is required to 
3
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what exactly is the “best interest of the child”? Its definition, at best, 
is ambiguous and left to be defined by that particular court. The term 
often follows the findings and instructions from the court on the care 
of a child.8 “Best interest” becomes a term of art that justifies a 
court’s order for certain conduct, or cessation of certain conduct, for 
a child’s caregiver.9 In the end, though, the best interest standard 
should be less discretionary.  
A. Defining “best interest” 
“Best interest” should be interpreted as the constitutional right 
of the child, equal to parental rights over that child,10 with both rights 
being applied in a limited manner and protected from governmental 
intrusion by the court. “Best interest” should not be based upon the 
government or court’s standards and values.11 When this particular 
term is used in court, it is common for individuals affected by it to 
search for a definition or guideline for clarification. The court has 
                                                                                                                                      
act in order to protect and care for children in place of their parents, it is to be 
guided by the “best interest of the child.” Id. at 210. 
8 For example, every finding involving children under Title 10A and Title 43 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes require the court to make determinations in its rulings that they 
are in the best interest of the children. The approach is consistent with those found 
in other jurisdictions. See In re Foshee v. Foshee, 247 P.3d 1162, 1167 (Okla. 
2010); Murrell v. Cox, 226 P.3d 692, 700 (Okla. 2009); In re M.W., 292 P.3d 
1158, 1163 (Colo. App. 2012); Sparks v. Sparks, 75 So. 3d 861, 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011); In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2009); In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Campise 
v. Campise, 671 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (App. Div. 1998). 
9 For example, in hearings to relocate with children, the court is to determine if the 
request is made in good faith. If the request is made in good faith, then the burden 
shifts to the non-relocating party to show it is not in the best interest of the 
children. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.3 (West 2013); In re Adoption of 
C.A., 137 P.3d 318, 319 (Colo. 2006) (en banc); Fredman v. Fredman, 960 So. 2d 
52, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
10 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that when the rights of the child are in conflict with the rights of the parents, the 
child’s rights should be protected first). 
11 See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Children, Kin, and Court: Designing Third Party 
Custody Policy to Protect Children, Third Parties, and Parents, 12 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 95 (2008) (describing the vague, subjective application of 
the “best interest” standard seen when a court awarded custody to a child’s 
grandparents based on the “Bohemian lifestyle” of the child’s father).  
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struggled in the past with defining terms and the exercise of 
constitutional rights. Much like the term “obscenity” in 1964, the 
“best interest of the child” standard is “subjective, difficult to 
articulate, and differs based upon the unique facts of each case.”12 
Justice Stewart will always be remembered for his definition of 
“obscenity” in Jacobellis v. Ohio, when he stated: 
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of 
material I understand to be embraced within that 
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I 
see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is 
not that.13  
 
After the ruling in Jacobellis, it took nine years for the definition of 
obscenity to develop under the law, and for the courts to feel 
compelled enough to establish a definition with the Miller test.14 
Today, however, we still do not have a working definition of “best 
interest” as it relates to the precious lives of children and their 
families. 
The “best interest of the child” standard is still applied in an 
“I know it when I see it” fashion.15 In fact, “[t]he term is so difficult 
to define that it has been omitted from the sixth edition of Black’s 
Law Dictionary (1990) and from other reference tools designed to 
translate the law from legalese to a common language understood by 
those who are affected by the law.”16 Further, “[t]he ‘best interest of 
the child’ standard often operates as a fiction to soothe the 
                                                          
12 Wayne, supra note 1, at 36.  
13 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
14 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (finding obscenity is not 
protected under the First Amendment and going on to define obscenity as when 
“‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . . whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct . . . and . . .  
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”).  
15 Wayne, supra note 1, at 36. 
16 Id. 
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conscience of judges, lawyers, and parents who invoke it as a mantra 
without meaning.”17 This oft-quoted fiction is created by imposing 
outside values into the family combined with the lack of a working 
definition of “best interest.” 
Essentially, all those courts that interact with children have a 
tendency to overlook the fundamental rights of both the child and 
parents when applying their own good judgment in the decision 
making process.18 A court’s order should contain more than, “I find it 
in the best interest of the child” when ordering how the parent will or 
will not perform his or her parental duties. There needs to be a 
balancing of identified rights of both the parents and child.19  
B.  Balancing the rights of parents against the rights of 
children 
Lawyers, parents, and social workers often argue that being in 
the “best interest” of a child is what that person truly believes is good 
for the child. Each person’s view of what is good for the child is as 
diverse as the individuals involved. This concept of what is good for 
the child is not synonymous with what is in the “best interest” of the 
child. According to the U.S. Constitution, the court should not use 
the standard that determines what is good for the child, but instead 
should use the narrower standard that looks to what is in the “best 
interest” of the child. In other words, “best interest” should protect 
the rights of the child.20 The court is only authorized to act based 
upon the “best interest” of the child; it simply does not have the 
                                                          
17 Id. at 37. 
18 Id. at 41 (describing the potential for abuse of the “best interest” standard based 
on a judge’s lack of understanding of available community resources and the 
complexity of the social problems affecting parties). 
19 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102 (West 2013) (recognizing that parents 
have a natural, legal, and moral right, as well as a duty, to care for and support their 
children, that a child has a right to be raised free from physical and emotional abuse 
or neglect, and that the State should only intervene when necessary to protect a 
child from harm or threatened harm). 
20 Due process protections preclude the State from exercising power over persons 
without appropriate consideration of and preservation of an individual’s rights. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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authority to do what is basically good for the child.21 What is “good” 
for the child is a much more expansive idea than what is in the “best 
interest” of a child. What is good for a child is subjective and 
requires a value decision. Determining the “best interest” of a child 
requires weighing and balancing the individual constitutional rights 
of the parents and the child.  
Part of the determination of what is good for the child 
includes an application of a standard of care. Good is a relative term 
whose weight can only be interpreted by the speaker. Therefore, it is 
the speaker’s interpretation of good, and as such is the speaker’s 
standard of good—meaning good care. But the question is, “whose 
standard of good care should we use?” Often, it is the standard of 
care of the court itself.22 Imposing a standard of care does not require 
a balancing of interests; it merely incorporates the values, thoughts, 
and desires of the court.23 This imposition of the court’s standard of 
care upon the parents is paramount to governmental intrusion into 
                                                          
21 For example, it might be “good” for the court to act out of general concern for 
the health of an overweight child where the parents were not taking action. 
However, determining the “best interests” of the child would involve determining 
the specific needs of the overweight child and whether the parents were attentive to 
them, including any weight-related medical conditions. The court’s authority to 
demand certain behaviors of the parents must be grounded in an objective 
determination of the risks the child faces, not upon a subjective, value-based 
reaction to what the judge thinks the parents are doing “wrong.” 
22 Wayne, supra note 1, at 37. “The legal literature does not offer much guidance in 
understanding the meaning of the best interests of the child as a legal standard. 
One, perhaps cynical, author stated, ‘the best interests of the child standard often 
operates as a fiction to soothe the conscience of judges, lawyers, and parents who 
invoke it as a mantra without meaning.’” See also Nancy Neraas, Comment, The 
Non-Lawyer Guardian Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: The 
King County, Washington, Experience, 58 WASH. L. REV. 853, 867-68 (1983) 
(stating that there is no consensus on the meaning of the term “best interests of the 
child”). These articles represent popular beliefs that the standard is void of content.   
23 A standard of care is subjective and based upon personal values and preferences 
in how a child should be raised. It is possible for there to be as many as three 
standards of care in a family matter: the parent, the community, and the judge. The 
standard of care could best be described as: under a given set of circumstances, 
what would be a reasonable, prudent person’s actions? The less defined the criteria 
for determining reasonable and prudent, the higher the risk that it is left up to the 
subjective thoughts of the fact finder. 
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family life.   
In contrast, when acting in the best interest of the child, the 
court must balance the rights of the parents and the rights of the 
child. Parents have a constitutional right to due process before the 
government may intrude upon their parental rights.24 It is not a matter 
of the degree of governmental intrusion that invokes the 
constitutional provisions of due process. Even if the court’s intrusion 
is minimal, due process still is unlikely to be waived.25 If one right 
applies, then all rights must apply, including the rights of the 
children. In recognizing the rights of the parent, the court should not 
overlook the rights of the child. After all, the court is balancing the 
rights of the parent with the rights of the child, and where the rights 
of the child are in conflict with the rights of the parent, the rights of 
the child should prevail. 
C.  The need for an objective standard 
Parents have a constitutional right to raise their child as they 
see fit.26 How can this constitutional right of the parent be weighed 
against something as elusive as the “best interest” of the child? In 
light of the difficulty that comes with addressing this question, “there 
is a fear that judges, either intentionally or unintentionally, will apply 
their own personal values and preferences to the lives of the families 
that come before them . . . .”27 It has been argued, due to the 
vagueness or lack of criteria of the best interest standard, that 
decision makers are vulnerable to social biases.28 In order to balance 
the constitutional rights of the parent with the best interest of the 
child, the decision should be based on as objective a standard as 
                                                          
24 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.12 (1977) 
(commenting on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972), noting that the 
Court rested its holding in part on the constitutional right of parents to assume the 
primary role in decisions concerning the rearing of their children); see also Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (finding that absent a finding of unfitness, 
parents are the primary decision makers in raising their children).  
25 See Verheydt v. Verheydt, 295 P.3d 1245, 1251 (Wyo. 2013) (noting that a 
waiver of due process “occurs when there is an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right manifested in an unequivocal manner”).  
26 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69, 71.  
27 Wayne, supra note 1, at 41. 
28 Id. 
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possible, rather than on vague and subjective standards of the fact 
finder.29 Next, it is important to consider how the authority of the 
court relates to this fluid definition of “best interest.”   
 
III. Authority of the Court 
 
 The authority of the courts comes from the United States 
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789.30 The U.S. Constitution is 
a living, historical document allowing the courts to deal only with the 
rights of the people as opposed to imposing the court’s opinion 
regarding what is merely good for the people. Dealing with the rights 
of the people includes interpreting rights,31 enforcing rights,32 
defining rights,33 limiting rights,34 protecting rights from intrusion,35 
                                                          
29 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (7th ed. 1999) (defining standard as “A model 
accepted as correct by custom, consent, or authority”; “A criterion for measuring 
acceptability, quality, or accuracy.” Further defining objective standard as “A legal 
standard that is based on conduct and perceptions external to a particular person”).  
30 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 545 (1840) (answering the question of the 
authority of the state in depriving an individual’s personal liberty, Chief Justice 
Taney stated, “[W]here is drawn in question, among other subjects, the validity of 
an authority exercised under any state, on the ground of such authority being 
repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States, and the decision of the 
state Court is in favour of the validity of such authority”). 
31 Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1992-93 (2010) (interpreting the rights of a 
custodial parent under the Hague Convention).  
32 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002) (holding that the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) creates no personal rights to enforce 
under Section 1983, barring a former university student’s claims under that 
section).  
33 McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3020 (2010) (holding that the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms is fully applicable to the States by virtue of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
34 Blair v. City of Chi., 201 U.S. 400, 457-58 (1906) (limiting the rights to use the 
Chicago streets for street railway purposes based upon the Court’s interpretation of 
the actions between the parties).  
35 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (finding that rights and privileges 
are secured by the Fourteenth Amendment by way of prohibition against state laws 
and proceedings affecting such rights and privileges).  
9
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and giving consequences when rights are violated.36 Therefore, the 
court is required to interpret and define “best interest” of the child as 
the rights of the child. When the parental rights come into conflict 
with the rights of the child, the court may protect the child’s rights by 
limiting the parent’s conduct or enforcing the child’s rights by 
removing the child from the parents’ care. But until there is a 
balancing of rights between the parents and child, the court should 
protect the rights of the parents from governmental intrusion. 
A. Constitutional limits on actions by the courts 
Today’s court system was authorized such that the judicial 
power “shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their authority.”37 The Judiciary Act of 
1789 set up the court structure, with each court’s authority arising 
under the Constitution.38 In a speech at Georgetown University on 
October 25, 1985, Justice William Brennan Jr. stated, “The 
Constitution on its face is, in large measure, a structuring text, a 
blueprint for government. And when the text is not prescribing the 
form of government it is limiting the powers of that government.”39 
The Constitution limits the authority and power of the executive and 
judicial branches of government to interfere into the private life of 
the home.  
Therefore, the government’s limitation is based upon the 
rights of the individuals.40 The more intrusive government action in 
the private life of the family becomes, the greater the need to protect 
the individual rights within the family unit and avoid judgments that 
                                                          
36 Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 n.1 (1829) (addressing 
the question of public use of land and proper compensation regarding rights of 
individual property owners). 
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
38 Matter of Steamboat Josephine, 39 N.Y. 19, 21 (1868). 
39 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech at the Text and Teaching Symposium, 
Georgetown University, Wash. D.C. (Oct. 12, 1985) [hereinafter Justice Brennan, 
Jr., Speech], transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/democracy/sources_document7.html. 
40 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636-37 (1943) (stating 
that government power is limited in favor of individual freedom). 
10
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may temporarily appear to be the “public good.”41 Life within the 
home is in need of the utmost protection due to its private nature.42 
The governmental entities that yield power over individuals must 
recognize the constitutional limitations to act. “The challenge is 
essentially, of course, one to the capacity of our constitutional 
structure to foster and protect the freedom, the dignity, and the rights 
of all persons within our borders, which it is the great design of the 
Constitution to secure.”43  The court must scrutinize and limit any 
governmental action that hinders family interaction. However, when 
the court does intervene into the affairs of the family, court 
intervention should necessarily protect the rights of the family, which 
involves balancing the individual rights of each family member.   
B. Balancing the rights of all involved 
A judge must carefully balance the rights of all family 
members involved and not exercise his or her own authority 
according to his or her own morals and values.44 Justice Brennan 
quoted Justice Robert Jackson in stating, “the burden of judicial 
interpretation is to translate ‘the majestic generalities of the Bill of 
Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the 
eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with 
the problems of the twentieth century.’”45 These restraints should be 
exercised as courts interpret and protect the rights of the entire 
family. However, this “concrete restraint” fell to the wayside as 
complicated family issues were presented before the court. Courts 
now fashion remedies to everyday issues within the family, claiming 
to act in the “best interest” of the child. Yet, because of the court’s 
subjective definition of “best interest,” this encroaches the court’s 
standards and values on raising a family into someone else’s home. 
                                                          
41 Justice Brennan, Jr., Speech, supra note 39 (“As government acts ever more 
deeply upon those areas of our lives once marked ‘private,’ there is an even greater 
need to see that individual rights are not curtailed or cheapened in the interest of 
what may temporarily appear to be the ‘public good.’”). 
42 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
43 Justice Brennan, Jr., Speech, supra note 39. 
44 Wayne, supra note 1, at 41. 
45 Justice Brennan, Jr., Speech, supra note 39 (quoting Justice Robert Jackson in 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639).  
11
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In defining “best interest” as the rights of the child, the court must 
determine which rights its orders protect, thus restraining the court 
from imposing its own version of “good” in the name of “best 
interest.” 
It has long been recognized that parents have a fundamental 
constitutional right to the upbringing of their children. In Pierce v. 
Society of the Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or 
guardian’s right to decide the mode in which his or her children are 
educated.46 The state may not usurp this right when the questioned 
legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.47 The 
Court, in declining to give an exact definition of the liberties 
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment in Meyer v. Nebraska, 
did recognize that included within the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
freedom from governmental interference in the private home, 
particular regarding child rearing.48 This Constitutional protection 
can only be guaranteed when protecting and balancing all individual 
rights of each family member.   
Another example of the protection of the private family unit is 
illustrated in the Court’s ruling in Wisconsin v. Yoder. The Supreme 
Court held that a Wisconsin law that compelled parents to send their 
children to public school until the age of sixteen was unconstitutional 
as applied because it impermissibly interfered with the plaintiff’s 
Amish religious beliefs.49 Soon after this decision, the rights afforded 
to children began to evolve as courts dealt with family issues. It is in 
                                                          
46 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533-34 (1925). 
47 Id. at 534 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and stating that 
parents have a liberty interest in the upbringing of children). The Supreme Court 
further found that the legislation prohibiting parents from choosing private 
education for children unreasonably interfered with liberty of parents to direct 
upbringing of children. Id. 
48 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398. 
49 See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (stating that a 
state’s interest in universal education, however highly ranked, is not totally free 
from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights and 
interests, such as those protected by the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious 
upbringing of their children).  
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such complex family cases, while balancing individual rights, that 
courts need to retain the essence of the Constitution and not impose 
their own substantive values over the rights of the individual. 
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, adopted in 1865 
and 1868 respectively, were a response to the deprivation of rights by 
the states,50 declaring that no person can be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without the due process of law.51 The Supreme Court 
emphasized, in Parham v. J.R.,52 the necessity of balancing “the 
family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children” 
and “children hav[ing] a substantial and protectable liberty 
interest.”53 The family and each of its members are constitutionally 
protected from governmental intrusion. As a result, “the Court 
concluded that parents retain a ‘substantial, if not dominant, role in 
the decision . . . absent a finding of neglect or abuse.’”54 
Consequently, courts must carefully weigh the constitutional rights of 
the family and not impose their own values and morals onto the 
upbringing of the children.  
Even the best interest standard, without a balancing of rights, 
can be devoid of objective value in visitation disputes as well.55 
Without a balancing of rights, there is concern that a judge will 
impose his or her subjective values and bias.56 So, some judges put 
                                                          
50 Several southern states were not willing to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment 
abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude. See Gordon Leidner, The Thirteenth 
Amendment, GREAT AM. HIST., 
http://www.greatamericanhistory.net/amendment.htm (last visited May 28, 2013). 
The Fourteenth Amendment acknowledged a constitutional right and provided, for 
those affected, a cause of action against the states that refused to enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
51 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
52 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631-32 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
53 Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home: When 
Parental Authority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 80 (2011). 
54 Id. 
55 See Alessia Bell, Note, Public and Private Child: Troxel v. Granville and the 
Constitutional Rights of Family Members, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 254 
(2001) (“In the name of the child’s best interests, courts have denied custody based 
on a parent’s sexual orientation, race, financial status, or presumed promiscuity.”).  
56 Id. 
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forth the mantra of “best interest” as if this lessens the subjectivity of 
imposing their own values. All decisions regarding the life of a child 
must be in the “best interest” of the child. The judge often begins his 
or her ruling with “I find it in the best interest of the child to . . . ” 
and then proceeds to announce how the child will be raised. Often, it 
is never mentioned how the ruling is in the “best interest” of the 
child, thus leaving it up to whatever the judge says it is. Award or 
denial of parental visitation often amounts to little more than a good 
faith guess based on a judge’s personal experience and preference 
about what best serves the child.57 For example, in Troxel v. 
Granville, the trial judge ordered visitation to the child’s 
grandparents based on the judge’s own memories of childhood 
vacations with his grandparents.58 In overturning the trial judge’s 
decision, however, the Supreme Court nonetheless refused to 
question more broadly—beyond an as-applied analysis—the 
constitutionality of the best interests standard.59  
Clearly, when a judge imposes his or her own standards and 
values in decisions affecting the family, this action invades into 
private family life, thus violating the constitutional guarantee against 
governmental intrusion. The Fourteenth Amendment cannot be 
disregarded or diluted with judicial determination as to the “best 
interest” standard. Justice Brennan warned of weakening the 
Constitution in this way when he stated: “the Fourteenth Amendment 
by a process of absorption . . . has had its source in the belief that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if [those guarantees] . . . were 
sacrificed.”60 Even during the Constitutional Convention, it was 
argued that “[t]he Judiciary ought to have an opportunity of 
remonstrating [against] projected encroachments on the people as 
well as on themselves. It had been said that the Judges, as expositors 
                                                          
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (noting that the “Troxel plurality recognized the best interests trap [that the 
standard is devoid of objective value in visitation disputes] but failed to escape its 
grasp” and go beyond the case before the court in attempting to define ‘best 
interest’).  
60 Justice Brennan, Jr., Speech, supra note 39 (quoting Justice Cardozo in Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). 
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of the Laws would have an opportunity of defending their 
constitutional rights.”61 Without an objective “best interest” standard, 
there are no checks and balances on the encroachments into the 
family that the executive and judicial branch of government may 
conceive.  
Therefore, under the U.S. Constitution, it is the role of the 
court to limit governmental intrusion into the life of the family. 
Interference in family life should only occur if there is a compelling 
state interest or to protect the rights of individual family members 
against one another. This includes the rights of children. The court 
should recognize and balance the rights of each family member 
before the court determines the need to interfere into the family.  
 
IV. Rights Encompass All Individuals 
 
 While rights have evolved over time, children’s rights have 
not always been clearly recognized. For many years, children 
constituted “property” under the authority of their fathers, ignoring 
any constitutional rights of the mother.62 This viewpoint eventually 
gave way to the “tender years” doctrine, which found that, all things 
equal, young children should primarily be in the care and custody of 
their mothers.63 It appears that the effects of the movement to 
recognize women’s rights included the area of family law. And 
during this time, the courts continued to act with an ambiguous 
definition of “best interest of the child”; hence, family issues 
continued to come before the court, subject to the standards and 
values of the judge.   
A. Protecting the rights of the family 
The ultimate protection in limiting governmental intrusion 
                                                          
61 James Wilson, Debate from the Constitutional Convention Regarding the 
Function of the Judiciary (July 21, 1787), transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/democracy/sources_document5.html.  
62 Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 64 (N.Y. 1840); see also Com. v. 
Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203, 205 (1834) (holding that the father, in general and 
by law, is entitled to the custody of his child). 
63 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 11 (repealed 1983); see ROBERT G. SPECTOR, 
OKLAHOMA FAMILY LAW: THE HANDBOOK 314 (2011-2012 ed. 2011).  
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into the family can only be done through the courts of justice. As 
stated before, it is the role of the court to protect the constitutional 
rights of each family member. “Without this, all the reservations of 
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.”64 
Accordingly, the courts are designed to protect the rights of the 
people and, when it comes to family law, the rights of the family. As 
previously discussed, governmental intrusion is only appropriate to 
protect the rights of a family member as balanced against one 
another. Based upon the role of the court, the use of the “best 
interest” definition must be limited so as not to infringe on the 
constitutionally protected rights of all family members.  
With this understanding, the Constitution does not allow 
judges to impose their own standards and values into the private lives 
of families. As Alexander Hamilton, a Founding Father of the United 
States, stated, “[t]hey (being judges) ought to regulate their decisions 
by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not 
fundamental.”65 The court’s role is to protect the personal rights of 
individuals guaranteed by the Constitution without imposing personal 
judicial standards and values. “The protection of individual rights 
through judicial review remains an irreplaceable protection for 
individual freedom in the United States.”66 The safeguarding of 
personal rights of the family members is better protected when 
determining best interest requires recognizing and balancing the 
rights of parents and children. 
  It has been suggested that the “legislatures and courts have 
defined and re-defined the contours of factfinding [sic] and the scope 
of judicial authority in child custody litigation by adjusting the 
century-old mantra ‘best interest of the child.’”67 The phrase “best 
interest” implicates a range of public policy and personal values 
potentially as divergent and numerous as there are judges.68 But best 
for whom? If it is best for the child, why and how so? If it is best for 
                                                          
64 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
65 Id. 
66 RALPH C. CHANDLER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK: INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS 8 (2d ed. 1993). 
67 Prescott, supra note 2, at 110. 
68 Id. at 110. 
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the family, it seems this would necessitate defining the why and how 
for each family member.  This implies, in and of itself, a balancing of 
interest between all family members. Whose standard shall apply to 
raising a child? If the best interest standard is left to the court’s 
discretion, how does this allow for a “judicial [system] that is 
predictable, determinate, and knowledge-based”?69  
B.  Protecting children under the Parens Patriae doctrine 
To provide some guidance for determining the best interest of 
the child, the government’s role has been labeled parens patriae.70 
The parens patriae doctrine grants the state with inherent power and 
authority to protect persons who are legally unable to act on their 
own behalf, such as children.71 The law presumes that parents act in 
the best interest of their children.72 However, when the state believes 
that parents are not acting in the best interest of the child, the state 
may intercede on behalf of the child under the parens patriae 
doctrine. Thus, the doctrine creates a state actor who imposes its own 
morals and viewpoints upon parents who have the right to raise their 
children as they see fit. The Constitution limits these intrusions into 
                                                          
69 Id. at 119. 
70 Mahmoodjanloo v. Mahmoodjanloo, 160 P.3d 951, 956 (Okla. 2007) (Kauger, J., 
concurring) (acknowledging that the State of Oklahoma has a right in the role of 
parens patriae to preserve and promote the welfare of children). 
71 Sauro v. Sauro, 42 A.3d 227, 237-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (noting 
that the parens patriae doctrine authorizes the Family Court to modify freely 
negotiated arbitration clauses concerning child custody and parenting time, by 
imposing judicial oversight to prevent an adverse impact or harm to the child); see 
also Sizemore v. Pickett, 76 So. 3d 788, 795 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (raising issues 
pertaining to the child’s welfare and parental fitness and finding that the court 
possesses a duty to determine the best interest as parens patriae).  
72 In re Bordalo, 55 A.3d 982, 984 (N.H. 2012) (recognizing the parents’ 
fundamental liberty interest in raising their children and this does not go away 
simply because the parents have not been model parents); see also Norrod v. 
Norrod, 165 P.3d 366, 370 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (holding that to obtain custody 
in a divorce proceeding over the objection of a parent, a grandparent must show the 
parent’s unfitness by evidence that is clear and conclusive, and makes the necessity 
for doing so appear imperative; the unfitness may not be demonstrated by a mere 
comparison between what is offered by the competing parties, but only by a 
showing that the parent cannot reasonably be expected to provide for the child’s 
ordinary comfort or intellectual and moral development).   
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the family. Judicial oversight is required for the government to 
infringe upon the family’s rights. Without a judicial determination of 
neglect or abuse, there is no legal basis for intruding into the family.     
Parens patriae in America came from the British rule that 
granted the royal prerogative of the King to act in his capacity as 
parens patriae, or universal trustee.73 In McIntosh v. Dill, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that “well-organized and civilized 
government requires the power to control the persons and property of 
. . . infants, lunatics, and those held incompetent,” under parens 
patriae.74 Parens patriae is meant to promote action in the best 
interest of the child.75 Judge Cardozo described the doctrine in Finlay 
v. Finlay as the judge putting:  
[H]imself in the position of a ‘wise, affectionate and 
careful parent’ and mak[ing] provision for the child 
accordingly. . . . He ‘interferes for the protection of 
infants, . . . by virtue of the prerogative which 
belongs to the [state] as parens patriae.’ The 
‘paramount consideration for the court at the time of 
divorce, or at the time of a requested alteration of a 
decree regarding custody, is the present and future 
welfare and well-being of the child.’76  
                                                          
73 Dollar Sav. Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. 227, 239 (1873); see also United 
States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 359 n.16 (1949) (“The most general words that can 
be devised (for example, any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate) affect 
not him (the King of England) in the least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish 
any of his rights and interests. The rule thus settled respecting the British Crown is 
equally applicable to this government, and it has been applied frequently in the 
different States, and practically in the Federal courts.”). 
74 Jones v. Jones, 680 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the state 
should not interfere with parental rights to their children unless there is a failure to 
discharge the parental duty); McIntosh v. Dill, 205 P. 917, 917 (Okla. 1922); see 
also In re G.W., 977 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the state has 
a compelling interest in protecting children and the authority to intervene when 
parents abuse, neglect, or abandon their children (citing G.B. v. Dearborn Cnty. 
Div. of Family & Children, 754 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App 2001) trans. 
denied (2002)).  
75 Prescott, supra note 2, at 123. 
76 Id. at 122 (internal quotations omitted). 
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But parens patriae does not supersede the Constitution,77 
consequently bringing into question the standard used in making 
provisions for a child. Under the Constitution, does a judge have the 
authority to place him or herself in an “affectionate and careful” 
position when dealing with children? The courts are concerned 
“about diminished capacity of youth,” and “the Court has 
consistently recognized the State’s need to adjust its legal system to 
account for the unique role of the family and the vulnerability and 
special needs of the minor.”78 But this adjustment of the legal system 
has led the courts to do what is good for the child, not what is in the 
“best interest” of the child. What is good for the child is much more 
expansive and subjective than what are the rights of the child as in 
“best interest.” 
Judges should consider the fundamental constitutional rights 
of all family members rather than simply applying their own 
judgment over that of the parents. The Constitution provides a very 
narrow scope for allowing intervention into the family. The judge’s 
authority to act in the best interest of the child is based upon evidence 
of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. When court intervention is 
necessary, it demands the balancing of the rights of the parent with 
those of the child. The court must respect the parental standard of 
care for the child unless the parents’ conduct rises to the level of 
abuse or neglect, affecting the child’s health, welfare, safety, or 
creating a risk of imminent harm.   
 
V. Rights of the Child 
 
 Parents are not the only persons who have rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment; children do as well. Since In re Gault, the 
court system has begun recognizing children as having constitutional 
                                                          
77 In re G.W., 977 N.E.2d at 384-85 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects a parent’s fundamental right to raise a child, but that said right was not 
unlimited; the state has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children 
and, where there is neglect, abuse, or abandonment of the children, the state has 
authority under parens patriae to intervene). 
78 Henning, supra note 53, at 83.  
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rights.79 Because children are recognized as having constitutional 
rights, state intrusion into the family requires the child’s rights to be 
recognized in the balancing of all family members’ rights before state 
action can begin. In re Gault, a landmark U.S. Supreme Court 
decision, held that juveniles accused of crimes in a delinquency 
proceeding must be afforded the same due process rights as adults, 
such as the right to timely notification of the charges, the right to 
confront witnesses, the right against self-incrimination, and the right 
to counsel.80 In re Gault recognized children’s rights for the first 
time, noting that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 
did not apply exclusively to adults.81 However, in establishing that 
children were guaranteed rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Gault Court noted: 
The Court’s concerns for the vulnerability of children 
is demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors’ 
claims to constitutional protection against deprivations 
of liberty or property interests by the State. With 
respect to many of these claims, we have concluded 
that the child’s right is virtually coextensive with that 
of an adult.82  
 
In other words, the Court recognized that children have rights to be 
protected, but left the questions as to how the child’s rights stood 
against those of the parents, and when a child should be allowed to 
exercise these rights. The Court answered these questions in a 
subsequent case, Bellotti v. Baird. 
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court continued to recognize 
a child’s rights as being protected by the same constitutional 
guarantees as adults, but allowed the state to take into account 
“children’s vulnerability and their needs for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, 
                                                          
79 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 230 (1973) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (recognizing that all children everywhere in the nation are protected by 
the Constitution and could seek redress from the courts if those constitutional rights 
were violated).  
80 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
81 Henning, supra note 53, at 62 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13). 
82 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
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and . . . paternal attention.’”83 The state could account for these 
concerns by adjusting its legal system, due to the fact that children 
“lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and 
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”84 As only the 
child’s vulnerability may be taken into account, it follows that the 
state’s adjustment of its legal system does not include disregarding 
the parental rights to the upbringing of their children. Short of abuse 
or neglect, parents continue to have a constitutional right in raising 
their children based upon the parents’ standards and values, not the 
state’s standards and values.85 The Supreme Court in Bellotti, for 
example, recognized the crucial right of parents to control the 
nurturing and direction of their child’s destiny.86 It was viewed as the 
role and obligation of the parents to instill moral standards and 
religious beliefs as they prepared their child for active citizenship. 
The Constitution protects the rights of parents to exercise 
their standard for raising a child against governmental intrusion, 
except for abuse or neglect that affects the child’s health, welfare, or 
safety.87 The court should not override the parents’ standard of care 
with its own.88 When a court does not distinguish between what is 
best for the child and what is in the best interest of the child, the court 
therefore begins to delve into childrearing, which is prohibited by the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court in Bellotti recognized the 
constitutional rights of parents to determine the upbringing of their 
children without interference by acknowledging liberty and freedom 
                                                          
83 Id. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)). 
84 Id.   
85 See In re G.W., 977 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the state 
has a compelling interest in protecting children and the authority to intervene when 
parents abuse, neglect, or abandon their children). 
86 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-38.  
87 See supra Part III.   
88 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 623-25 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing 
the rebuttable presumption that parents act in the best interest of their children, 
recognizing a child’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, noting the balancing 
of the parents’ and child’s rights, and the state’s authority for intervention only in 
the event of abuse or neglect); see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) 
(ruling in favor of the grandparents based upon the judge’s own relationship with 
his grandparents growing up).  
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of choice in raising a child based upon the parents’ “ethical, 
religious,” and “political beliefs” that “the state can neither supply 
nor hinder.”89 
Given this information, how is the court to recognize, 
interpret, and protect the rights of the child? As the Court in Bellotti 
stated, “if the child shows that she is ‘mature enough and well 
enough informed’ to understand the procedure and to make an 
intelligent assessment of her circumstances, she is entitled to exercise 
her right . . . without interference by her parents.”90 This reasoning 
underscores the fact that the law does not change, but the child’s 
understanding and maturity transforms, entitling him or her to more 
fully exercise his or her rights. The lady holding the scales of justice 
is blindfolded for a reason. The law is applied to all equally; race, 
religion, gender, and age are not contributing factors. The facts 
change from one case to the next, but the application of the law to 
those facts should not change.  
As noted in Bellotti, it is the child’s ability to understand and 
make an intelligent assessment of his or her rights that determines his 
or her ability to exercise those rights, though balanced against the 
parents’ right in raising their child.91 And it is the Constitution that 
protects the private lives of families from court intrusion.92 
Accordingly, “the entry . . . into a home, for whatever purpose, 
represents the greatest governmental intrusion into an individual’s 
privacy.”93 Most often, these types of intrusions dictate and affect the 
parents’ standard of care.94 But this “standard of care” is 
constitutionally protected from governmental intrusion within the 
                                                          
89 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (describing the state’s dedication to individual 
freedom and freedom of choice as the basis for refraining from dictating the way 
parents should raise their children). 
90 Id. at 643. 
91 Id. at 633-34. 
92 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66. 
93 Henning, supra note 53, at 89. This entry into the home may include, for 
example, state intervention, a parenting coordinator’s decision, or a court order 
limiting or denying parent conduct. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68. 
94 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69. 
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home, with an exception for abuse and neglect.95 A parent’s right to 
raise his or her child according to his or her standard of care must be 
recognized when interpreting the “best interest of the child.”96  
Over time, the courts have recognized the constitutionally 
protected interest in parents’ rights to raise their children as they 
deem appropriate, with minimal government interference.97 This is as 
fundamental as the parents’ right to establish their home, which 
includes the raising of their children.98 After all, the courts begin with 
the presumption that parents act in the child’s best interest. Due 
process requires the balancing of the rights of parents and children 
before the government may interfere in the family. Due process also 
protects the constitutional rights of the individual family members 
through the presumption that parents act in the best interest of their 
children.99 This governmental interference includes the court’s 
decisions regarding the choice of educational needs, religion, medical 
care, discipline, recreational activities, and so forth.100 If the courts 
are going to recognize, and hold accountable to some limited degree, 
the parents’ responsibility to raise their children, then parents “are 
                                                          
95 Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 429 (5th 
Cir. 2008). 
96 Id. 
97 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring). 
98 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
99 Henning, supra note 53, at 74; see also Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and 
Due Process, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 123, 132 (1999) (stating that the rights of the 
parents to raise their children is fundamental and protected by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, that due process protections are invoked when 
governmental action threatens parents’ rights to the custody of their children, and 
that parents may not be deprived of the right to raise their children absent a strong 
governmental interest); see also US Supreme Court Upholds Parental Rights in 
Troxel v. Granville—June 2000, FAM. CT. VALUES BLOG (Apr. 12, 2009, 1:31 
PM), http://familycourtvalues.blogspot.com/2009/04/us-supreme-court-upholds-
parental.html (noting that without a finding of parental unfitness, courts infringe 
upon parental rights if they make decisions contrary to parental determinations of 
what is in their child’s “best interest”); Who Really Guards the Bill of Rights? Its 
Not Conservatives, FAM. CT. VALUES BLOG (Apr. 8, 2009, 7:51 AM), 
http://familycourtvalues.blogspot.com/2009/04/who-really-guards-bill-of-rights-
its.html.   
100 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
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entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that 
responsibility.”101 There are legal restrictions placed on children in 
recognition of parental roles that are vital to the child’s opportunity 
for growth and maturity, and which uphold our free society.102 “Thus, 
both legislative and judicial deference to parental control and 
instruction prepares children to live independently and advances 
individual freedoms and liberty in society.”103 Governmental 
interference within the home requires a compelling state interest.104 
A decision involving the home affects all family members.105 The 
Constitution applies equally to both parent and child and “the court 
should balance those rights.”106  
 
VI. Parental Rights Versus Children’s Best Interest 
 
 Once it is established that all family members have 
constitutional rights, the task in defining and protecting those same 
rights results from balancing them. This requires three 
considerations: these rights are equal; the child’s rights may be 
treated as unequal, balanced against the rights of the parents; and the 
state, in balancing the child’s rights, can limit the parents’ rights.107   
A. Equal consideration 
 The fact that they are children does not support the idea that 
their rights are inferior to the rights of their parents.108 “Although it is 
virtually undisputed that children have some Fourth Amendment 
rights independent of their parents, it is equally clear that [in some 
                                                          
101 Henning, supra note 53, at 75. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
105 See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD  4-5 (2012), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest.pdf 
(noting the importance of maintaining sibling and other close family bonds when 
children are removed from their homes).  
106 Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000). 
107 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 3. 
108 Id. 
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circumstances youth will receive] less constitutional protection than 
adults.”109 When determining constitutional rights, it has been argued 
that children should have equal consideration.110 The difference is, as 
in Bellotti, the child’s ability to fulfill their role in appreciating and 
applying those rights.111 This equal consideration theory is based 
upon a common sense approach of three equal theses: Equal 
Consideration Thesis, Unequal Consideration Thesis, and Limited 
Parental Rights Thesis.112 It has been further argued that equal 
consideration should be given to everyone due to his or her moral 
status.113 The equal consideration theory should be applied to the 
rights of individuals. Children are entitled to moral consideration 
simply because they are persons.114 The Constitution, under this same 
premise, protects rights of all individuals without exception.115 
Because children are persons, they are entitled to the same 
constitutional protections as any adult.116 In order to deny this 
assertion, one would need to argue either that individuals do not 
derive their rights from their status as persons, or that children are not 
individuals.117 
 Therefore, by virtue of “being,” the same rights protected for 
                                                          
109 Henning, supra note 53, at 59. 
110 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 2. 
111 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. 
112 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 3 (offering a rights-based theory of the 
moral status of children that the authors claim both meets the constraints that define 
the commonsense position and resolves the internal conflicts the three theses may 
propose). By “distinguishing basic rights to which all persons are entitled from 
constructed rights that depend on factors besides one’s status as a person, and by 
thinking of parental rights as stewardship rights and thus as right with thresholds, 
we can reconcile the three claims that make up the commonsense position with 
regards to the moral status of children.” Id. at 13. 
113 Id. at 2.  
114 Id. 
115 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . 
.”) (emphasis added).  
116 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 3. 
117 Id. 
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adults also belong to children.118 Those rights “include the rights to 
life, liberty, property, and freedom from deliberate harm.”119 But 
when do rights become protected by the Constitution and enforceable 
through the courts? As far as the right to life, it attaches to the child 
at a certain term in utero.120 The right to liberty is up for debate since 
Roe v. Wade121 as to when the court can take action, balancing the 
rights of the woman and a viable unborn child. One of the challenges 
is seen in Bellotti with the exercise of a minor’s right to obtain an 
abortion without parental consent.122 In another instance, regarding 
the right to property, it is a matter of determining age and maturity in 
order for the child to act based upon his or her own best interest.123 
The right to freedom from deliberate harm attaches immediately at 
birth and is enforceable by the courts without question.124  
It is not when the rights attach to the child that matters; it is 
when these rights can be exercised by the child and balanced within 
the framework of the parental rights and best interest of the child.125 
According to the Bellotti court, a child may exercise his or her rights 
independently of his or her parents when the child understands, 
                                                          
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 6. 
120 As the Court struggles with the issue of abortion, they have found that states 
have an interest in the unborn child at the point of being viable. The state argues it 
has an interest over the privacy rights of the mother to regulate in a limited manner 
the issue of abortion on behalf of the fetus. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 
492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989).  
121 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
122 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640-41. 
123 Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) 
(stating minors are prohibited from purchasing guns or ammunition); see Berg v. 
Traylor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, 146-47 (Ct. App. 2007) (placing a limitation on 
minors signing contracts); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 
588-89 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that every state prohibits the sale 
of alcohol to those under age twenty-one).  
124 R.W.D. v. Walker Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 808 So. 2d 46, 48 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2001) (removing a child that tested positive for cocaine at birth from the care 
of the parents); see also In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) 
(involuntarily terminating the parental rights of a mother who was incarcerated).  
125 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. 
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appreciates, and can intelligently exercise those rights.126 But until 
that time, the parents are responsible for preparing their child for 
adulthood.127 The responsibility of that parent is to raise a child with 
the values and morals that align with the family, whether or not the 
court agrees with those values and morals.128 This responsibility falls 
on the parent, until such time that the child can either intelligently 
exercise his or her broad constitutional right, as well as statutorily 
acknowledged rights, such as driving a car, voting, or purchasing 
firearms. Such statutory rights may be curtailed in ways that 
otherwise could not constitutionally be limited in the case of an 
adult.129    
The right to abortion is another example of a right that 
depends on the maturity of the child who is exercising the right. 
Before a child may obtain an abortion without parental consent, she 
must demonstrate the ability to intelligently and knowingly exercise 
that right. For some rights, however, the court has upheld that the 
only requirement for this determination is the age of the child. An 
eighteen-year-old does not need to demonstrate that he or she can 
intelligently vote for a candidate, as age is the only legal requirement. 
But before the child may exercise his or her right, the child may be 
treated differently than adults. Until the child can demonstrate the 
above criteria, there is the unequal treatment of the child in 
exercising the constitutional right to privacy.130 Requiring the legal 
process for a minor to petition the court for an abortion without 
parental consent allows the rights of the child to be recognized as 
equal, but subject to the parents’ oversight and standards. When a 
judge determines a child has met her burden of proof to obtain an 
abortion without parental consent, that child has equally recognizable 
rights as the parental rights. But without a court order, the exercise of 
                                                          
126 After taking testimony from the juvenile, a judge must determine whether or not 
the juvenile has demonstrated the necessary criteria based upon Bellotti and the 
statutes to grant her request to have an abortion without parental consent. Id. at 
633-34. 
127 Id. 
128 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). 
129 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. 
130 Id. 
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the child’s rights can be limited. This is the unequal treatment of the 
child’s rights, which leads to the next proposition. 
B. Unequal thesis: parental authority over their children’s 
rights 
 There are certain activities adults may freely participate in that 
would neither be in the child’s “best interest,” nor appropriate for 
someone under the age of eighteen. While it would be 
unconstitutional to prohibit an adult from participating in these 
activities, children can be prohibited from participating in them by 
the executive and judicial branches of government.   
The Unequal Treatment Thesis: Children – at least at 
certain ages – can be legitimately prevented from 
doing certain things that it would be illegitimate to 
prevent adults from doing. Most of us accept this 
thesis. Well-known and plausible examples of things 
we allow adults but not children to do are voting, 
driving cars, owning firearms, signing contracts, and 
drinking alcohol.131  
 
Even though children may have rights, the ability to exercise 
those rights is legitimately prevented until either of two occurrences. 
As in Bellotti, the child must first be able to demonstrate that he or 
she is mature enough to exercise those rights;132 and second, the child 
must be able to exercise those rights upon reaching the appropriate 
age. The legislature has limited the exercise of certain rights until 
reaching what has been deemed a permissible age, for example, to 
vote or enter into a contract.133 It is permissible to limit a person’s 
right to enter into a binding contract until he or she reaches the age of 
eighteen. If a child is emancipated before the age of eighteen, 
however, a court has determined that the child has demonstrated the 
maturity to exercise the right to contract. “A person can have a role-
                                                          
131 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 3. 
132 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-34. 
133 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-101 (West 2013) (stating that eighteen is age of majority, 
except that persons sixteen or over who are or have been married are considered to 
be of age for all matters relating to contract, property rights, liabilities, and capacity 
to sue and be sued); Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 7. 
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dependent right only if she can fill the role in question. When rights 
depend on roles, if you can’t play the role, then you don’t get the 
right.”134 Legislation has declared children incapable of exercising 
certain rights, presumably because children do not have the requisite 
level of intellect necessary to make rational decisions in exercising 
those rights.135 As long as the parents act in the best interest of their 
children, parents have “stewardship rights.”136 It is suggested that 
‘parent-as-steward’ carries with it duties toward the child. Those 
duties include “not violating the rights of the child,” not allowing 
others to do so, and promoting “the interest of the child.”137    
This presumption of parental duty over the exercise of the 
child’s rights is not the same as balancing the rights of the parent and 
the rights of the child.138 This difference is considered under the 
Limited Parental Rights Thesis in which “[p]arents can legitimately 
exercise limited but significant discretion in raising children.”139 The 
Constitution and various statutes140 acknowledge the parent’s 
responsibility and the right of the child to be raised in a mentally, 
physically, and emotionally healthy atmosphere.141 This is the start of 
                                                          
134 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 7. An example would be when a child 
petitions the court for emancipation. A finding of emancipation allows the minor to 
become “role-dependent” in ability to contract. Id. 
135 For example, anyone under the age of eighteen cannot marry without parental 
consent, or get a tattoo, and under most circumstances, those who enter into 
contract with a minor may not be able to enforce it against said minor due to age. 
See, e.g., Daubert v. Mosley, 487 P.2d 353, 357 (Okla. 1971) (finding that an 
emancipated minor by way of marriage could not disavow the contract due to his 
age).    
136 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 11. 
137 Id. at 12. 
138 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 624 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
139 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 4. 
140 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102 (West 2013) (stating that parents 
have a natural, legal, and moral right, as well as a duty, to care for and support their 
children and such rights are protected by state and federal laws as well as the 
Constitution). In practice, where family circumstances threaten the safety of a 
child, the state’s interest in the welfare of the child takes precedence over the 
natural rights and authority of the parent to the extent that it is necessary to protect 
the child and assure that the best interests of the child are met. 
141 Parham, 442 U.S. at 604. 
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the slippery slope where courts begin to use the phrase “best interest” 
when in fact the court is dealing with what it believes is good for the 
child.142 As previously observed, when courts deal with what is good 
for a child, the court usually thrusts its subjective values and 
standards into the privacy of the home.143   
As a hypothetical example, no court would personally 
approve of a parent raising their child to adopt the radical religious 
views of a white supremacy group. Could it be argued that being 
brought up with these views can be emotionally and mentally 
harmful? Such an argument has been made,144 but constitutionally, 
the standard should be based upon the parents’ standard and not that 
of the court, short of abuse or neglect.145  
It is the opinion of this author that, absent evidence of mental 
or emotional abuse, the issue is whether the parents have a right to 
raise their child in this manner. Even though this author would not 
wish to see such a radical view imposed upon a child, its harm cannot 
be measured in such a way as to intrude upon the parents’ rights in 
raising their child. This would be tantamount to forbidding a parent 
to such a practice and would be based upon a value standard. If there 
was a measure of significant harm to the child, this could be a basis 
for removing the child from the home. Yet child welfare has not 
removed children based upon these circumstances. When considering 
the best interest of the child, there needs to be a finding that the 
parents’ behavior is detrimental to the child physically, emotionally, 
or mentally before the court should act.146 When there is such a 
                                                          
142 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. 
143 Id.  
144 Jarrell v. Jarrell, No. W2011–00578–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 1066398, at *3 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012) (holding that courts must maintain strict neutrality 
involving religious disputes between divorced parents unless it threatens the health 
and well-being of the child); see also Harrison v. Tauheed, 256 P.3d 851, 864 
(Kan. 2011) (differentiating between a parent’s religious beliefs and religiously 
motivated actions or conduct that affects the best interest of the child).  
145 Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 429 (5th 
Cir. 2008). 
146 Ervin R. v. Phina R., 717 N.Y.S.2d 849, 856-57 (Fam. Ct. 2000). Here the court 
found that both parents’ hostility toward each other was not due to religious beliefs 
or practices, but rather were the parties using their religion to interfere with the 
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finding, the government, acting through the court system, has a duty 
to intercede on behalf of the child.147 The courts have had a tendency 
to impose their morals and values into homes where the parents lack 
education and scarce means of support and to inform these parents 
that they are inadequate based upon the best interest of the child 
standard.148 The parents have the right and “the responsibility to 
nurture and protect the child, and the authority to exercise [their] own 
judgment in doing so on a day-to-day basis.”149 Parents have been 
assigned the right to raise their children, protected from 
governmental intrusion—except for instances of abuse and neglect—
in such a way as deemed proper according to the parents’ standard of 
care—not the standard of care of the court.150 The right of parents to 
raise their children free from governmental intrusion151 creates a 
rebuttable presumption that parents act in the best interest of their 
child. In order for the government to rebut this presumption, the 
balancing of individual rights must occur. The evidence must be 
sufficient before the government may intervene. In balancing the 
rights of the parents and the child, where there is a conflict, the 
                                                                                                                                      
relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent. Id. The court ruled the 
custodial parent determines the appropriate level of religious beliefs and the parent 
receiving visitation must honor it. Id. See also Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 
N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1982) (finding a mother to be less fit and changing primary 
custody where the original decree stated the children would be brought up in the 
parents’ faith because the mother’s conduct was found to be “flagrantly violating 
those tenets which ‘confused the children and was contrary to their religious beliefs 
and detrimental to their religious feeling’”). 
147 See Gates, 537 F.3d at 429. 
148 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78-79 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that parents should be 
“free of judicially compelled visitation” because “a judge believed he ‘could make 
a better decision’ than the objecting parent had done”); Wayne, supra note 1, at 41 
(arguing that without an articulated standard, the fear is that judges “apply their 
own personal values and preferences”); see also Bell, supra note 43, at 254 
(arguing that without an “objective value,” findings amount to a “good faith guess” 
and are based upon a judge’s personal experiences). 
149 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 4. 
150 See Gates, 537 F.3d at 429. 
151 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
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child’s rights prevail.152 This leads to the third and final thesis. 
C. Third thesis: best interest of the child may outweigh 
parental rights 
  The third thesis is the “Limited Parental Rights Thesis” and 
is described as parental rights with thresholds.153 Under this thesis, 
parental rights may be infringed upon under two conditions: first, 
when there is a conflict between the best interest (i.e., rights) of the 
child and the rights of the parent; and second, if doing so will bring 
about a large enough benefit to the child.154 
As applied to parental rights versus children’s rights, usually 
both of the above overriding conditions are present. When a child is 
initially removed from the home in a juvenile case, the executive 
branch of the government—the Department of Human Services or 
the District Attorney’s office—must prove to the court that there is a 
reasonable suspicion that the child’s health, welfare, or safety may be 
in imminent danger.155 An example would be the use of corporal 
punishment. It is a general consensus among judges that if the 
corporal punishment rises to the level of leaving bruises or 
lacerations, then the child’s right outweighs the right of the parents to 
discipline their child because of the abuse and neglect exception to 
parental rights.156  Unless the use of corporal punishment raises a 
                                                          
152 Matter of Welfare of Tarango, 595 P.2d 552, 555 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) 
(holding that when the rights of the parent and the welfare of the child are in 
conflict, the welfare of the child must prevail); see also S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. 
Roe, 639 S.E.2d 165, 168 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the interest of the 
child shall prevail if the child’s interest and the parental rights conflict).  
153 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 8. 
154 Id. at 8-9. This condition is met when the child’s needs are not being met, which 
leads to or potentially could lead to imminent harm or danger to the child. “So long 
as the child is not being harmed, parental rights are generally not to be infringed 
merely to provide some marginal benefit for the child.” Id. 
155 See, e.g., Arce v. Cnty. of L.A., 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 735, 746 (Ct. App. 2012); 
Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 244 P.3d 247, 250 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010); 
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 23 A.3d 352, 354 (N.J. 2011). 
156 Judges may not believe in corporal punishment. Some may not have raised their 
children with the use of corporal punishment. This is a valid value judgment on 
behalf of any parent. However, to date this author is unaware of any statutes or 
court findings where the use of corporal punishment alone rises to the level of state 
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reasonable suspicion that the child’s health, welfare, or safety would 
be at issue, the parents have a right to discipline their child, which 
overrides any child’s right in this situation.157 The parents have the 
right to discipline their child—as long as it does not rise to level of 
physical or mental abuse—because this brings about a greater benefit 
to society and also outweighs any rights the child may have, if any, to 
being punished as the parents see fit. “Thus for the parent who 
respects the spirit of the basic rights of the child, and who is willing 
to infringe them only when necessary and only to the degree 
necessary, the rights of the child will generally not interfere with the 
effective nurturing of the child.”158 This illustration demonstrates the 
difference between a parent spanking the child in a disciplinary way 
versus just walking up and slapping the child upside the head because 
the parent is angry. “[T]he fact that parents do have rights [suggests] 
that so long as the child is not being harmed, parental rights are 
generally not to be infringed merely to provide some marginal benefit 
for the child.”159 “Discipline literally means training that is expected 
to produce a specific character or pattern of behavior”160   
The right of parents to raise their child as they see fit becomes 
more complicated when the court is dealing with separated parents 
who choose to raise their child differently, such as in the case of 
                                                                                                                                      
intervention in child abuse cases. However, a judge who handles divorce and 
paternity cases is more likely to intervene based upon his or her valued belief. 
157 G.C. v. R.S., 71 So. 3d 164, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing a finding 
of domestic violence when the father used corporal punishment in non-excessive 
manner and recognizing “a parent’s right to administer reasonable and non-
excessive corporal punishment to discipline their children”); see also Hamilton ex 
rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 270 P.3d 1024, 1031 (Haw. 2012) (reversing a lower court 
decision and stating that “parents have a fundamental right to discipline their child 
under the United States and Hawaii Constitutions that includes a right to employ 
corporal punishment”); cf. Griffith v. Latiolais, 70 So. 3d 71, 79-80 (La. Ct. App. 
2011) (granting joint custody and an order prohibiting corporal punishment by 
either parent).  
158 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 17. 
159 Id. at 9. 
160 William Carmichael, SEVEN HABITS OF A HEALTHY HOME: PREPARING THE 
GROUND IN WHICH YOUR CHILDREN CAN GROW 92 (Lynn Vanderzalm ed., 1997). 
“[G]ood discipline is applied as an external boundary. The goal is to keep external 
boundaries in place until children develop their own external boundaries.” Id. at 95. 
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divorce or paternity actions. Both parents have an equal 
constitutional right to raise their child when in their home.161 
However, when a parent has sole legal custody, these rights change if 
they pertain to certain major decisions related to raising a child.162 
The court may only interfere if the action rises to the level of 
significant harm to the child’s rights or upon a showing of a change 
of circumstances sufficient to warrant custody modification.163   
Courts start with the presumption that parents will act in the 
best interest of their children. “This stewardship conception of 
parental rights allows us to posit parental rights – and thus keep the 
state from meddling too much in family affairs – without treating the 
child as property of the parent.”164 And who better to exercise this 
stewardship than the child’s parents? In doing so, parents are 
                                                          
161 In re Adoption of Ta’Niya C., 8 A.3d 745, 754 n.13 (Md. 2010) (noting that 
when it comes to “custody (and visitation) disputes,” neither parent “has any 
preference over the other” and making a distinction between a parent and a third 
party, stating “there is a legal preference” and that “we have recognized that 
parents have a fundamental, Constitutionally-based right to raise their children free 
from undue and unwarranted interference on the part of the State, including its 
courts”); McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 770 (Md. 2005) (“In a situation 
in which both parents seek custody, each parent proceeds in possession . . . of a 
constitutionally-protected fundamental parental right. Neither parent has a superior 
claim to the exercise of this right to provide ‘care, custody, and control’ of the 
children. Effectively, then, each fit parent’s constitutional right neutralizes the 
other parent’s constitutional right . . . .”); see also Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812, 
817 (Nev. 2005) (“In a custody dispute between two fit parents, the fundamental 
constitutional right to the care and custody of the children is equal.”). 
162 A.G.R. ex rel. Conflenti v. Huff, 815 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 
(finding the custodial parent enjoys the right to determine the religious training of 
the child as long as the custodial parent does not use it as a means to interfere with 
the noncustodial parent’s parenting time and there is no showing of substantial 
harm affecting the child’s physical health or emotional development); see also 
Hamilton, 270 P.3d at 1027 (holding that the non-custodial parent retains the right 
to discipline his child for conduct that occurs while under the supervision of the 
non-custodial parent); Baldwin v. Baldwin, 710 A.2d 610, 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1998) (Brosky, J., dissenting) (stating that the non-custodial parent has an interest 
in sharing in the rearing and love of the child).  
163 See, e.g., Fridley v. Fridley, 748 N.E.2d 939, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Shade v. 
Wright, 805 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).  
164 Brennan & Noggle, supra note 3, at 13. 
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presumed to be looking not only to the present health and welfare of 
the child, but also to maximize the future health and welfare of the 
child.165    
When courts begin weighing parents’ rights versus children’s 
rights, “it requires that judges have a standard of well-being by which 
to assess children’s interests. As a policy, the best interest guides 
judges by requiring that they decide what is in the children’s best 
interest, but it leaves open to interpretation what is in a child’s 
interest.”166 The standard of well-being courts should use to assess a 
child’s interest should be that of the parents if there is no evidence of 
harm to the child’s health, welfare, or safety that rises to the level of 
abuse or neglect. Parents’ rights to decide without interference are 
still subject to some limits, though, and must be balanced against the 
constitutional rights and well-being of the child.167 The presumption 
that parents act in the best interest of their children168 may be 
overcome by evidence of harm to the children, the risk of error in the 
parents’ judgment, or conflicts in the home that likely undermine the 
ability of parents to act in their children’s best interest.169  
 When dealing with the family, the court should recognize the 
rights of each family member and how the relief requested affects 
each right. Next, the court should balance each of those rights and 
where the parents’ rights are in conflict with the rights of the child 
(i.e., best interest), the child’s rights should prevail.170   
 
VII. Limiting Parental Authority Over the Rights of the Child 
 
                                                          
165 Id. at 18. 
166 Id. 
167 Doan-Uyen Thi Le v. Thang Q. Nguyen, 241 P.3d 647, 652 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2010) (“[U]ltimately, custodial decisions, even those involving termination of joint 
custody, are dependent upon the best interests of the child.”); see also In re 
Paternity of C.A.S., 468 N.W.2d 719, 727 (Wis. 1991) (“The best interests of the 
children are the ultimate and paramount considerations.”). 
168 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71.  
169 Henning, supra note 53, at 79. 
170 Doan-Uyen Thi Le, 241 P.3d at 652. 
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Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to limit the parental 
authority over the rights of the child. This can be seen in the abortion 
context.171 “The Court was more willing to impose more 
comprehensive judicial procedures to protect the fundamental rights 
of minors.”172 Once the child could express an intelligent and mature 
basis for wanting to exercise her rights apart from her parents, the 
court has allowed the child to exercise her individual Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.173 “[T]he Court concluded in Bellotti v. Baird 
that society’s interest in safeguarding parental authority and 
preserving family unity was outweighed by the rights of mature 
minors to obtain an abortion without their parents’ consent.”174 Some 
determinations deeming children mature enough and capable of 
exercising their rights intelligently are defined in statutes based on 
age, such as when they may drive a vehicle, vote in federal and state 
elections, or drink alcoholic beverages. To deny the exercise of these 
rights to an adult would not be permissible. “In mediating conflict 
between the rights and interests of children and their parents, the 
Court has often imposed procedural safeguards that vary with the 
nature of the interest at stake and has recognized the maturity of 
some minors to make their own decisions and protect their own 
interests.”175  
However, in protecting the integrity of the family, the courts 
must balance the rights of the entire family.176 “The state must guard 
not only [children’s] current liberty, but also their future liberty. It 
must deny all others, including parents, the right to deprive the young 
either of their basic liberty during their immaturity, or their ability to 
                                                          
171 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-34. 
172 Henning, supra note 53, at 81. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 82. 
176 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-1-102 (West 2013). The Oklahoma Children’s 
Code provides the foundation and process for state intervention into the parent-
child relationship whenever the circumstances of a family threaten the safety of a 
child and to properly balance the interests of the parties stated herein.   
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develop the capacity to exercise their future liberty.”177 This is the 
best interest of the child. The courts must commit to this never-
ending balancing act that plays out in the courtroom. The state cannot 
overlook the rights of the parents, nor can it overlook the rights of the 
child in determining the best interest of the child. Even more so when 
courts are asked to intervene, especially after the breakdown of the 
family, courts must understand that there are individual rights 
attributable to both parents and the child that must be taken into 
consideration before they can impose what they deem to be in the 
best interest of the child. 
 The job of the court is to protect rights and enforce laws. In 
the context of the family, this protection does not come with a license 
to intrude upon the family, thus violating the parents’ right to decide 
how their child should be raised, unless necessary to protect the 
rights of the child.178 “Best interest” is the rights of the child. The 
child’s parents, based upon their standards, values, and morals, 
initially guide these rights. Governmental intrusion should only be 
exercised to protect the child’s right to live free from parental abuse 
or neglect that could cause harm to the child’s health, welfare, or 
safety.179 Based upon the authority of the court in balancing the 
constitutional rights of the parents and child, it may override the 
parental rights to protect the rights of the child when the parents’ 
duty is not being met.180  
Interpreting “best interest” as the constitutional rights of the 
child protects the child and the family from government imposition 
of its own standards and values upon the family. “As the Supreme 
Court has stated, values, morality, and religion are things ‘the State 
can neither supply nor hinder.’”181 In order to assure that courts do 
not infringe upon the rights of the family, a standard for the best 
                                                          
177 Marcia Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant Reunification 
Decisions Should Be Based on the Best Interest of the Child, 2011 BYU L. REV. 
1139, 1152 (2011). 
178 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
179 Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 429 (5th 
Cir. 2008). 
180 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640-41.  
181 Zug, supra note 177, at 1158. 
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interest of the child must be determined and applied in every 
courtroom where these rights are being affected. Defining best 
interest of a child as the constitutional rights of the child allows the 
court to stay within its authority.   
Family issues are complex and case-specific, but balancing 
the rights of each family member provides some consistency to the 
court’s involvement into the family. This assures the family that 
decisions are made with as little personal judicial preference and with 
an emphasis on the rights of all family members. The only time the 
court should limit the rights of a parent is when those rights are 
outweighed by the rights of the child, thus taking much of the 
ambiguity out of what would be in the best interests of the child. 
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